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NO DEFENSE FOR SELF-DEFENSE:  
DETERMINING WHETHER COURTS SHOULD 
ORDER INSURERS TO REPRESENT INSUREDS 
WHO HAVE ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE 
Alex Dzioba* 
 
The right to defend oneself has traditionally been heavily protected by 
courts in all scenarios.  However, the refuge that an act of self-defense 
provides becomes muddled in the context of an insurance agreement.  State 
courts are split on whether an insured who claims to have acted in self-
defense is entitled to legal representation and compensation from the 
insurer in light of an insurance contract containing an intentional injury 
exclusion clause.  This clause is used virtually uniformly throughout the 
insurance industry and it has caused courts to ponder if an act of self-
defense fits within the language of such a clause, and, consequently, if an 
act of self-defense should be excluded from insurance coverage.  This Note 
analyzes both the textual and public policy arguments that are set forth by 
the proponents of each side of this dispute as well as the lines of reasoning 
courts use in justifying their divergent rulings.  Taking this analysis into 
consideration, this Note ultimately concludes that acts of self-defense 
should be excluded from coverage when traditional policy terms are used. 
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INTRODUCTION 
You are attacked in your own home.  You fight back.  You have done 
nothing wrong, yet your insurance company asserts that it is not legally 
obligated to cover your damages or represent you.  This might not seem 
fair, but what if you previously agreed to let the insurance company off the 
hook?  This situation is created by intentional injury exclusion clauses that 
are found in personal liability insurance contracts. 
An intentional injury exclusion clause prevents the insured from 
recovering damages that he caused on purpose.1  Many would agree that 
acts of self-defense fit within this definition based solely on a literal 
 
 1. See 10 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 140:64 (Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla eds., 3d 
rev. ed. 2011). 
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reading.2  On the other hand, many would also agree that appropriate force 
used in self-defense should be a heavily protected right.3  Then again, a 
contract is no more than what its terms state, and a basic precept of contract 
law is to allow individuals the freedom to contract as they see fit.4  As 
evidenced by this back and forth, courts that encounter this type of suit face 
a difficult decision, and their decisions have been anything but consistent.5 
Part I of this Note gives a background on the insurance industry, 
specifically personal liability insurance.  This overview begins with a look 
at the basic structure of insurance policies and some key provisions that are 
common to most policies.  This Part next provides an analysis of adhesion 
contracts and how insurance policies fit into that analysis.  A summary of 
some important rules of construction and the competing principles of self-
defense and freedom of contract concludes Part I. 
Part II provides a breakdown of how different courts have interpreted 
intentional injury exclusion clauses in the context of self-defense and the 
arguments advanced on behalf of both the insurer and insured.  Part II first 
examines the competing assertions that can be made from a textual analysis 
of this exclusion clause.  This discussion focuses on how courts and 
commentators have interpreted the terms “intended” and “expected” as used 
in exclusion clauses.  Part II concludes by analyzing the opposing sides’ 
views regarding public policy concerns relating to this issue. 
Lastly, Part III asserts that courts should rule that acts of self-defense are 
excluded from coverage where there is an intentional injury exclusion 
clause.  Part III reaches this conclusion through a plain reading of the text, 
by considering public policy arguments, and by determining the most 
pragmatic approach. 
I.  BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY:  AN OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE POLICIES 
AND THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF THEM 
While most people in the United States have some form of insurance,6 
often times insured individuals will not bother to read or understand the 
terms of their insurance contracts.7  In light of this, this section begins with 
an overview of how liability insurance works and the common provisions 
 
 2. See, e.g., Weight v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1128 (D. Haw. 
2011); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Marshall, 554 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1997). But see Walters 
v. Am. Ins. Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1960) (holding that an element of wrongfulness 
or misconduct is connoted within exclusion clauses and finding that self-defense falls outside 
of the literal meaning of the terms). 
 3. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3023 (2010); Scribner v. Beach, 4 
Denio 448, 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847). 
 4. See Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 456 (1905). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. Health Insurance, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
hlthins/data/incpovhlth/2011/highlights.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (indicating that in 
2011, 84.3 percent of Americans had some form of health insurance). 
 7. Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) 
(referencing life insurance policies); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 
cmt. b (1981) (suggesting that the insurance industry does not expect the contracts to be 
read). 
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that can be found in such policies (specifically, the intentional injury 
exclusion clause).  Next, this Note discusses the insurance contract in the 
context of adhesion contracts.  A short description of the pertinent rules of 
construction that are commonly used for insurance contracts follows.  This 
section ends with an analysis of the competing principles of self-defense 
and freedom of contract as they relate to intentional injury exclusion 
clauses. 
A.  Liability Insurance Basics 
Insurance is a contractual security against anticipated loss where the risk 
of loss is occasioned by some future event and is shifted to the insurer.8  
The insurer accounts for this risk through the receipt of a premium paid by 
the insured that is placed into a general fund.9  This Note focuses on 
liability insurance, one type of insurance where intentional injury exclusion 
clauses are commonly found.10 
1.  Policy Fundamentals 
Liability insurance covers an insured’s liability to others for injuries or 
property damage for which the insured is legally responsible.11  
Furthermore, liability policies specify that the insurer has a duty to defend 
the insured against third party claims.12  A liability insurance policy only 
provides coverage for those hazards that are expressly covered by the terms 
of the policy.13  To remain covered under an insurance policy, the insured 
must make timely premium payments as specified under the terms of the 
agreement.14  The premium constitutes the insured’s consideration for the 
contract and, as a general rule, it must be paid prior to the time period 
intended to be covered.15 
Although insurers offer many different types of liability insurance 
policies,16 intentional injury exclusion clauses are most prevalent in 
 
 8. 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 1.6. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See 1 NEW APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.09 (Matthew Bender ed., 
rev. ed. 2012) [hereinafter APPLEMAN] (explaining that courts will seek to determine if the 
results of the insured’s conduct were intended or expected under a standard comprehensive 
general liability policy). 
 11. Lou-Con, Inc. v. Gulf Bldg. Servs., Inc., 287 So. 2d 192, 206 (La. Ct. App. 1973); 
Ryan Homes, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 647 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
 12. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.01. 
 13. Mem’l Props. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 46 A.3d 525, 532 (N.J. 2012) (“Courts cannot 
‘write for the insured a better policy of insurance than the one purchased.’” (quoting 
Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 2010))); see also Westfield Ins. Co. v. 
Porchervina, No. 2008-L-025, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5466, at *7–10 (Ct. App. Dec. 12, 
2008) (holding that emotional distress injuries are not covered under the policy definition of 
“bodily injury”). 
 14. Brooks v. La. Citizens Fair Plan, 4 So. 3d 899, 903–04 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 15. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 2.05. 
 16. Some of the more common liability insurance policies include:  comprehensive 
general liability, directors and officers liability, homeowners/renters liability, professional 
liability, automobile liability, and aviation liability. Id. § 1.01. 
2013] NO DEFENSE FOR SELF-DEFENSE 209 
comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance and homeowners 
insurance.17  CGL policies encompass the standard types of coverage of 
liability risk arising out of the operations of a business.18  In this sense, 
CGL policies are essentially the business equivalent of homeowners 
insurance.19  Both of these policies generally cover the insured’s liabilities 
for bodily injury or property damage caused to others.20  While coverage is 
typically limited to damage occurring on the insured’s property, policy 
coverage may be extended in certain cases.21 
Liability insurance policies are not necessarily uniform for every 
customer that seeks a specific type of insurance.22  Individual negotiations, 
applicable state regulations, and evolving judicial rulings all serve to 
differentiate insurance policies developed by the same insurer.23  
Nevertheless, the insurance industry has made the concept of standardized24 
forms a key component to its success.25  This has resulted in many 
commonalities that can be seen in all liability insurance policies, especially 
in terms of the structure of policies.26 
A liability contract will generally consist of five parts:  (1) the 
declarations page, (2) the insurance agreement, (3) exclusion provisions, (4) 
customized riders, and (5) conditions for coverage.27  The declarations page 
is a summary of the policy that contains all of the essential terms stated in 
an abbreviated form.28  Although it is viewed as a summary, the 
declarations page and its provisions are part of the policy, and its language 
is binding.29  The insurance agreement, often referred to as “the policy,” 
 
 17. Id. §§ 1.03, 1.09; ALLSTATE INS. CO., ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY STANDARD 
SELECT VALUE HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE POLICY 16, available at 
http://insurance.mo.gov/consumers/home/documents/AP148.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 18. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.03. 
 19. See id. (noting that in addition to bodily injury and property damages, CGL policies 
also cover personal and advertising injury). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Herring v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 795 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that liability arising out of the insured’s use of a golf cart at an off-premises 
golf course will generally be covered under the insured’s homeowners policy). 
 22. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.01. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Oftentimes, insurance companies will use standardized policies developed by the 
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO).  The ISO is a nonprofit organization, to which most 
insurance companies belong, that submits these standardized forms to insurance regulators of 
different states for approval.  Other insurers may use forms developed by the American 
Association of Insurance Services or develop their own forms. 2 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, 
§ 13.02. 
 25. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 26. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.01. 
 27. Id. § 1.02. 
 28. Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. 2007). 
 29. See Renz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 763 A.2d 1072, 1074–75 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).  
Where the declarations page is in conflict with other provisions within the policy, the 
provision is deemed to be ambiguous and the proper rules of construction should be applied 
to resolve this ambiguity. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 741 So. 
2d 424, 426–27 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Williams v. Farmers Ins. Co., 212 P.3d 403, 406 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2009). 
210 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
spells out the rights and obligations of both parties.30  Most policies also 
contain exclusion provisions, such as an intentional injury exclusion clause, 
which serve to narrow the liability of the insurer in circumstances where the 
insured would normally be covered under the insurance agreement.31  An 
insurance policy may also contain customized riders that are attached to the 
standardized policies.32  Riders contain negotiated provisions between the 
insurer and an individual insured that modify the general terms of the 
policy.33  Lastly, the conditions section explains additional duties for the 
insured, including timely notice of a claim and full cooperation with any 
insurer investigation.34 
2.  Insurer Duties 
In addition to a standard structure of policies, the obligations of insurers 
are also fairly uniform throughout the insurance industry because of 
standard provisions and case law.35  The two most essential obligations of 
an insurer are the duties to indemnify and to defend.36  The duty to 
indemnify is straightforward.37  The insurer must compensate the insured if 
the damages incurred by the insured are covered by the policy.38  The duty 
to defend is much broader and is completely separate from the duty to 
indemnify.39 
To satisfy the duty to defend, an insurer must retain counsel for the 
insured and direct the defense of the suit against the insured.40  If a conflict 
of interest arises, the insurer may be ordered to provide for independent 
counsel.41  An insurer’s duty to defend begins when the insured files a 
claim that may potentially fall within the individual’s policy.42  “[I]f the 
injured party states a claim, which, qua claim, is for an injury ‘covered’ by 
the policy . . . it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information . . . which 
indicates . . . that the injury is not in fact ‘covered.’”43  The insurer must 
continue to defend the insured “until all possible theories of recovery which 
could be covered by the policy are eliminated.”44 
 
 30. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 3.03. 
 31. Id.; see also ALLSTATE INS. CO., supra note 17, at 16. 
 32. See Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 400 
(5th Cir. 2008). 
 33. See id. 
 34. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 3.03. 
 35. See QBE Ins. Corp. v. Brown & Mitchell, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (S.D. Miss. 
2008); 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.05. 
 36. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.05. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 850–51 
(Ct. App. 2007). 
 40. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.05. 
 41. See 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 202:20. 
 42. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.05. 
 43. Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751 (2d Cir. 1949) (applying New York 
law). 
 44. Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 327 F.3d 448, 457 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(applying Michigan law); see also Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 
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Of course, the insurer may seek to have the court determine as a matter of 
law that the insured is not entitled to the duty to defend.45  This can be 
accomplished through a motion for summary judgment.46  An insurer’s duty 
to defend has traditionally been determined solely on a reading of the 
complaint against the insured and the insurance policy.47  This is known as 
the “eight corners” rule.48  If the allegations of the complaint lead the court 
to believe that the offenses would fall within the terms of the insurance 
policy, the insurer will be required to honor his duty to defend.49 
Perhaps in an attempt to expand this bright-line rule, insurers have 
trended towards conducting their own investigations relating to their duty to 
defend on individual claims.50  This has encouraged some jurisdictions to 
shy away from strictly adhering to the eight corners rule in favor of 
allowing external evidence (most likely discovered by the insurer) to be 
admitted.51  However, this expansion of permissible evidence can also serve 
to protect the insured.52  In many jurisdictions, if the insurer has uncovered 
facts illustrating that the insured is entitled to policy coverage, the insurer 
must uphold its duty to defend even if the complaint’s allegations do not 
sufficiently support such a conclusion.53 
3.  Intentional Injury Exclusion Clauses 
Determining the insurer’s obligations does not end the inquiry.  The 
essential question in a coverage dispute is, under what circumstances must 
the insurer honor its duties?  Personal liability insurance typically provides 
coverage on an “occurrence” basis.54  An occurrence is defined as an 
accident which results in bodily injury or property damage neither intended 
nor expected from the insured’s standpoint.55  Courts have defined the term 
accident as an event that is “unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.”56  
 
S.E.2d 801, 806 (W. Va. 2001) (noting that the insurer may be obligated to defend suits that 
are “‘groundless, false or fraudulent’” (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 
156, 160 (1986))). 
 45. See West v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 591 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
 46. See, e.g., id. 
 47. See Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 533, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Cluett v. Med. Protective Co. 829 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 48. Cluett, 829 S.W.2d at 829.  This rule is referred to as the eight corners rule because 
the court examines the four corners of the complaint in conjunction with the four corners of 
the insurance policy. Essex Ins. Co. v. Café Dupont, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169–71 
(D.D.C. 2009). 
 49. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Vanport Homes, Inc., 58 P.3d 276, 282 (Wash. 2002) 
(en banc). 
 50. 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 200:17. 
 51. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 
850 (Ct. App. 2007); Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162, 167 
(Ct. App. 2002); Peterson v. Ohio Cas. Grp., 724 N.W.2d 765, 774 (Neb. 2006). 
 52. 2 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 6.02. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See 9 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 126:29. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Corder v. William W. Smith Excavating Co., 556 S.E.2d 77, 82 n.12 (W. Va. 2001); 
see also Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Vic Koenig Leasing, Inc., 136 F.3d 1116, 1124 (7th Cir. 
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Assuming that there has been an occurrence, the insured will be covered if 
the damage has taken place in the coverage territory, it occurs during the 
policy period, and the insured did not know of the damage prior to the 
policy period.57 
Nevertheless, even if the insured conforms to these requirements, his 
actions may fall under an exclusion provision.58  This would prevent the 
insured from being covered by the policy.59  This Note focuses on the 
intentional injury exclusion. 
An intentional injury exclusion clause is designed to deny insurance 
coverage to those who cause damage on purpose.60  If the insured can 
control the risk of damage, the central concept of insurance is violated.61  
Compensating the insured for intentional acts incentivizes him to destroy 
property where the value of the insurance is greater than the property’s 
actual value.62  Furthermore, the insured could do harm to others with few 
financial repercussions.63  As a result, even where there is no explicit 
exclusion clause within the contract, courts may still impose this 
exclusionary provision as a matter of public policy.64 
B.  Adhesion Contracts 
Courts’ interpretations of insurance contract provisions are often heavily 
influenced by the idea that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion.65  
Therefore, this section presents an in-depth discussion on adhesion 
contracts.  This section defines adhesion contracts and looks at some of the 
harmful consequences of using them.  It then discusses these features in the 
context of insurance contracts. 
1.  Definition and Features of Adhesion Contracts 
An adhesion contract is traditionally defined by the following seven 
characteristics: 
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that 
contains many terms and clearly purports to be a contract. 
 
1998) (applying Tennessee law); State Bancorp, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 483 
S.E.2d 228, 234 (W. Va. 1997). 
 57. 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 1.07. 
 58. Id. § 3.03. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Woida v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 570, 572–73 (Minn. 1981) (en 
banc).  Acting intentionally to create a risk conflicts with the universal insurance principle 
known as the “fortuity doctrine,” which states that an act must be fortuitous to be subject to 
insurance coverage. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App. 1995) 
(explaining that any event that is a certainty is not fortuitous and, therefore, to allow a person 
to insure against the occurrence of such an event would be patently unfair to the insurer). 
 61. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 411 N.E.2d 1157, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
 62. See Med. Soc’y of N.Y. v. Serio, 800 N.E.2d 728, 731–32 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining 
that a common type of insurance fraud is to purchase insurance on a wrecked or salvaged 
vehicle, get into an accident, and collect for feigned damages). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Isenhart v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Am., 377 P.2d 26, 27–28 (Or. 1962). 
 65. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the 
transaction. 
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type 
represented by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter of 
routine. 
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation 
that, except perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term), the 
drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the terms contained 
in the document.  This representation may be explicit or may be implicit 
in the situation, but it is understood by the adherent. 
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to 
bargaining, the document is signed by the adherent. 
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented 
by the form—few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party. 
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction 
considered as a whole is the payment of money.66 
Scholars fear that the adhering party in these contracts usually does not 
read some, or all, of the terms.67  Whether it is because the terms of the 
contract are too detailed and complicated for the ordinary consumer to 
understand,68 or that the manner in which the contract is presented does not 
permit the consumer time to understand the terms,69 there is a fear that 
consumers do not know what they are getting themselves into.70  In fact, 
empirical studies have shown that consumers commonly do not read 
standardized adhesion contracts.71  Furthermore, courts and legal scholars 
agree that those who make regular use of these contracts have come to 
expect that customers will not read them.72 
A basic tenet of contract theory is that when a person signs a contract, 
that individual is assenting to the entire agreement.73  This principle has 
been carried over into the area of adhesion contracts despite the evidence 
that consumers often do not explicitly assent to the entire agreement.74  
 
 66. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion:  An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1177 (1983). 
 67. See id. at 1179; William M. Lashner, Note, A Common Law Alternative to the 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1982). 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981). 
 69. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 540 (1971) (explaining that purchasers of 
insurance often do not receive the details of their policies until after they have entered into 
an agreement to purchase the insurance). 
 70. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1176. 
 71. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business:  A Preliminary Study, 
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 59 (1963); William C. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the 
Automobile Industry:  Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 83, 143–53. 
 72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b; Rakoff, supra note 66, at 
1179 n.23. 
 73. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 & n.3 (1943). 
 74. See Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1176, 1185; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1176. 
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Under traditional theory, as long as the adherent had an opportunity to read 
the contract, all the terms of the contract will be enforceable against him, 
with few exceptions.75  However, courts have backed off how much they 
are willing to hold adherents accountable for what they sign in response to 
this contradiction between theory and reality.76 
The other major feature of adhesion contracts that scholars are wary of is 
the lack of choice that is given to the consumer.77  However, the phrase 
“lack of choice” should not be taken in a literal sense.78  In a competitive 
market, a consumer will typically be able to shop around for a different set 
of contractual terms within standardized agreements.79  Nevertheless, 
“[w]hen avoiding the undesired consequences seems of such overriding 
importance as to drive from the mind of the chooser all other 
considerations, we sometimes speak of his choice as being eliminated.”80  
This perception of lack of choice is more likely to occur when an industry is 
built upon the use of standard form contracts.81  Realizing that he is the 
weaker party, the consumer is left unable to bargain for better terms.82 
2.  Insurance Contracts As Contracts of Adhesion 
Insurance contracts have traditionally embodied the telltale 
characteristics of adhesion contracts,83 and they are generally accepted as 
such.84  In fact, courts often ignore or downplay evidence that individual 
insurance policies are not adhesion contracts.85  Although classification as 
an adhesion contract by itself is not that important, the belief that insurance 
 
 75. Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1185 (noting that the adherent is usually only excused 
when he can prove that the drafting party affirmatively participated in creating the adherent’s 
confusion). 
 76. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 77. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 549–50; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1176. 
 78. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 549–50 (describing lack of choice as an equivalent to 
coercion and acknowledging that there is usually always a literal choice that the adherent can 
make); Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1222 (referencing the back and forth between an appliance 
salesman and a consumer and noting that while there will be haggling over some terms, the 
consumer will ultimately concede to many provisions in the salesman’s form contract). 
 79. Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1179 (observing that customers generally only shop around 
for contractual provisions that immediately impact them (cash or credit), are easily 
comparable (size of payment), or are traditionally differentiated within a particular industry 
(warranties on consumer products)). 
 80. Slawson, supra note 69, at 549. 
 81. See id. at 550. 
 82. See id. at 549–50; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1176. 
 83. See Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1177, 1269 (acknowledging that insurance contracts 
are illustrative of the seven characteristics that traditionally define contracts of adhesion). 
 84. See id.; see also James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special 
Rules of Interpretation?:  Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1013 (1992); Lashner, 
supra note 67, at 1175, 1177 n.15 (noting that the term “contract of adhesion” was first 
introduced in an article that concentrated on insurance contracts); Harry F. Perlet, III, The 
Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 FORUM 116, 117 (1970). 
 85. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1013. 
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contracts frequently create a lack of choice and go unread by consumers has 
led some to criticize the insurance industry.86 
One main reason asserted to support the argument that the insurance 
industry does not provide adequate choice to consumers is the disparity in 
bargaining power.  This disparity is mainly a result of the insurance 
industry’s structure and the lack of information provided to consumers.87  
Since the eighteenth century, the insurance industry has consisted of 
relatively few sophisticated insurers servicing a large general public that has 
little experience with contracting.88  While the industry has grown, freedom 
of choice has not necessarily increased.89 
In addition, the manner in which insurers engage with their customers 
plays a large role in disincentivizing the insured from carefully reading over 
the policy.90  The most obvious issue with the process is that the insured 
often will agree to a contract and begin making premium payments before 
ever actually receiving the terms of the policy.91  Some scholars argue that 
this industry custom hinders the insured’s ability and motivation to 
understand the details of the policy.92 
Furthermore, upon receiving a policy, many individuals may feel 
overwhelmed by the complexity of the agreement and deduce that they 
would not be able to understand the terms even if they did read it.93  
Scholars have claimed that the perceived incapability to bargain and lack of 
choice takes away any reason for the insured to read his contract.94  As a 
result, the insured is often not aware of details within the policy that may 
limit his coverage, such as the exclusion clauses.95 
 
 86. See Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 388, 392–93 & n.5 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1981) (noting that an insured’s assent to the policy terms is “resembled rather than actual”); 
Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1177, 1225–29; Slawson, supra note 69, at 539–41. 
 87. See Perlet, supra note 84, at 117; Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 
14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 124–25 (2008). But see Fischer, supra note 84, at 1017 (asserting 
that courts have failed to realize that a disparity in bargaining power may have no effect on 
the fairness of a contract). 
 88. See Perlet, supra note 84, at 117.  In 2012, there were a total of 2,660 
property/casualty insurance companies operating in the United States. Industry Overview, 
U.S. INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/facts_statistics/industry-overview.html (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2013).  As of August 2013, there were 798 property/casualty insurers registered in 
New York State. Insurance Company Search, N.Y. ST. DEPARTMENT OF FIN. SERVICES, 
https://myportal.dfs.ny.gov/web/guest-applications/ins.-company-search (last visited Sept. 
20, 2013) (search “Property/Casualty Insurers” under the “Org Type” drop down menu).  
However, many of these insurers belong to the same parent company. See id.  For example, 
there are eight separate companies registered in New York that belong to the Allstate 
Insurance Group. Id. 
 89. See Randall, supra note 87, at 124–25. 
 90. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1180–81. 
 91. See id. at 1180; see also Slawson, supra note 69, at 540. 
 92. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1180; see also Slawson, supra note 69, at 540. 
 93. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1180.  Even business people and lawyers may find it 
too onerous to read through all of the complex legal terminology of an insurance contract. 
See Rakoff, supra note 66, at 1177, 1179 n.22. 
 94. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1180; see also Slawson, supra note 69, at 549–53. 
 95. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 136 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161–63 (Ct. App. 1977) (noting 
that an exclusion clause was added to an insurance contract renewal without being called to 
the consumer’s attention); Campione v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 375 N.E.2d 129, 130–32 
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These issues are compounded by the difficulty that a consumer faces 
when he attempts to retrieve a copy of the policy, or any pertinent 
information regarding coverage, before actually purchasing insurance.96  
While many consumers rely on their insurance agents for guidance, 
insurance agents often do not have a particularized understanding of the 
more complicated terms within the different policies they sell.97  Moreover, 
insurance agents’ compensation incentives may not always align with the 
best interests of their clients.98  Obtaining information from insurers’ 
websites is also often hit or miss,99 while television commercials are 
essentially void of all factual description.100 
Finally, one would think that a state insurance regulator would be able to 
provide useful information, especially in light of the fact an insurer is 
required to file its policies with the state.101  However, it is not uncommon 
to find that a state does not have complete and up-to-date policies to 
provide to consumers.102 
3.  Usefulness of Standardization in the Insurance Context 
Based on the foregoing description, the term “contract of adhesion” has a 
tendency to conjure up images of a ruthless, all-powerful conglomerate 
forcing a nonnegotiable, standardized contract onto a helpless individual.103  
However, there is little doubt that a vast majority of contracts that are 
entered into are standard form contracts.104  The reason for this 
phenomenon is that standardized contracts are useful to society in many 
ways.105  In fact, standard contracts are essential to the existence of the 
insurance industry.106 
For insurers to properly distribute risk amongst individuals that are 
similarly situated, the terms of each contract must be identical to each 
 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (acknowledging that the plaintiff was unaware of an exclusion clause 
that, if properly submitted to the state for approval, would have prevented his ability to 
recover). 
 96. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1263, 1319–37 (2011). 
 97. See id. at 1328–32. 
 98. Id. at 1331. 
 99. See id. at 1332–34 (acknowledging that some insurer websites are useful in giving 
specific information while others use useless general statements to describe their coverage). 
 100. See Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding:  The Tested Language Defense, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1093–98 (2010). 
 101. See Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1322–23. 
 102. See id. at 1323–25 (noting that record maintenance rules often make it difficult for 
regulators to keep policies updated and intact). 
 103. See Conrad L. Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 
6 FORUM 252, 252 (1970). 
 104. Slawson, supra note 69, at 529 (estimating that 99 percent of contracts made are 
standard form). 
 105. Squires, supra note 103, at 252; see also Kessler, supra note 73, at 631–32; Karl N. 
Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law, 
52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701–02 (1939). 
 106. See Squires, supra note 103, at 252–53. 
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other.107  If the pool of insureds and their respective policy coverage 
provisions are not homogenous, an insurer is no longer issuing insurance; 
rather, the insurer is taking bets.108  If an individual has coverage for an 
event that others do not have coverage for and are not paying premiums for, 
the insurer solely bears the risk of compensation should the event occur.109 
Standardized contracts are also helpful in keeping insurance costs 
down.110  This is accomplished in a couple of different ways.  Standard 
forms most directly minimize cost by saving the time and effort that both 
parties would normally exert through bargaining.111  When the parties are 
working with a familiar standard form, less time is needed to reach a 
finished product.112  A less obvious way in which insurers save money 
through standard contracts is by minimizing the costs of litigation.113  When 
drafting their standard policies, insurers are extremely particular with the 
language that is used to conform to the standards that have been laid out by 
the courts.114  Furthermore, the fact that every provision is the same in 
every contract limits the possibility of courts or juries making unpredictable 
decisions.115  As a result, insurers generally know how lawsuits against 
them will turn out and they can plan their legal expenses accordingly.116  In 
the end, these savings are typically passed on to the consumer.117 
In addition, some scholars have asserted that standardized contracts 
disregard human prejudices in a way that cannot be replicated through a 
bargaining process.118  Risk distribution is accomplished through statistical 
probabilities and the premium that is charged is not based on one’s ability 
to hire expensive lawyers that can bargain effectively.119  Also, by 
maintaining a homogenous pool of risk for each contract type, no individual 
is receiving extra security.120  In this sense, one can argue that insurance 
policy coverage is completely without prejudice.121 
 
 107. See id.; see also Kessler, supra note 73, at 631; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179. 
 108. See Squires, supra note 103, at 252. 
 109. See id. at 252–53. 
 110. See Kessler, supra note 73, at 632. 
 111. See Llewellyn, supra note 105, at 701.  Any legal costs that come up during 
bargaining are also saved. Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179. 
 112. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179. 
 113. See Kessler, supra note 73, at 632. 
 114. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 995–96 (recognizing the insurance industry as the 
most prolific in incorporating judicial data into the formation of its contracts). 
 115. Kessler, supra note 73, at 631 (claiming that the insurance industry is the first to 
recognize the importance of controlling “irrational factors” that may sway a judge or the jury 
to rule against a powerful defendant). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 632. 
 118. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179; Squires, supra note 103, at 252–53. 
 119. See Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179. 
 120. See Squires, supra note 103, at 252–53 (explaining that the separation of different 
policies is for the policyholder’s benefit in that a customer’s premium dollars are always 
placed in a fund that is dedicated solely to cover the risks that are covered in her own 
policy). 
 121. See id.; Lashner, supra note 67, at 1179. 
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C.  Rules of Construction 
While the benefits and detriments of standardized insurance contracts 
factor into the public policy discussion, courts will often interpret an 
insurance policy based on a textual analysis.122  For the most part, the 
interpretation of intentional injury exclusion clauses turns on how courts 
implement different rules of construction.123  Consequently, this section 
gives an overview of those rules that are most relevant to the interpreting 
intentional injury exclusion clauses.  This section summarizes the relevant 
rules of interpretation that are common to all contracts as well as those that 
are specific to insurance policies. 
1.  Rules Common to Contract Law 
Some legal scholars have commented that the rules of insurance contract 
interpretation have evolved to become completely different from traditional 
contract theory.124  However, a few fundamental principles that can be 
applied to all contracts are also vital to insurance policies.125  One such 
principle is that an unambiguous contract provision will be enforced as 
written.126  A court may not rewrite a contract to provide additional 
coverage to the insured that is not provided for within the terms of the 
coverage.127  After all, when an individual signs a contract, that person is 
assenting to all the terms of the agreement as written.128 
Based on similar reasoning, another relevant tenet is that courts are 
extremely hesitant to make contractual changes based on public policy.129  
This is true even of contracts of adhesion.130  Only where a contract is 
unquestionably against public morals or welfare may a court act as a voice 
of the public.131 
 
 122. See infra Part II.A. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Fischer, supra note 84, at 997 & n.7. 
 125. Id. at 1001–08. 
 126. Mem’l Props. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 46 A.3d 525, 532 (N.J. 2012) (“The terms of 
insurance contracts are given their ‘plain and ordinary meaning.’” (quoting Flomerfelt v. 
Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 2010))). 
 127. See id. at 532–33; see also Homes Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1975). 
 128. See Kessler, supra note 73, at 630 n.3.  The true intent of the parties is best 
ascertained through a plain reading of the written contract. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. 
Swift Energy Co., 206 F.3d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 129. Kessler, supra note 73, at 630–31 (noting that courts will often avoid incorporating 
public policy concerns into their interpretations of contract terminology because of the 
importance in protecting the right of parties to freely contract as they see fit). 
 130. See Mendoza v. Rivera-Chavez, 999 P.2d 29, 30–31 (Wash. 2000). 
 131. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Jefferson, 185 F. Supp. 2d 495, 498 (W.D. Pa. 
2002) (applying Pennsylvania law and holding that household exclusion clauses, which are 
designed to prevent family members who reside with the insured driver from collecting on 
an insurance claim, are not against public policy). 
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2.  Rules Developed for Adhesion Contracts 
Along with these universal contract principles, courts have established 
specific rules for insurance contracts, largely because of their adhesive 
nature.132  Where some ambiguity exists within the contract, courts have 
been very accepting of parol evidence133 to address this uncertainty.134  
However, if courts are unable to sift through the ambiguity, the contract 
will be interpreted in a manner that affords the greatest measure of 
protection to the insured.135  The ambiguity principle is similar to the 
general contract rule of contra proferentum.136  Nevertheless, the ambiguity 
principle systematically favors the insured when there is any doubt, while 
the traditional rule only applies as a tiebreaker.137 
Over time, some courts have expanded the ambiguity principle into what 
is referred to as the “reasonable expectations” theory.138  As originally 
formulated, the reasonable expectations doctrine stated, “[t]he objectively 
reasonable expectations of applicants . . . will be honored even though 
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those 
expectations.”139  Though this doctrine originated as merely a description of 
how courts were deciding cases, by 1970, “reasonable expectations” 
became a rule of law in some states.140 
Over the years, courts have shaped the reasonable expectations doctrine 
in many ways, creating different variations in different jurisdictions.141  
Currently, the most popular variation is that courts will only apply the 
doctrine after a finding of ambiguity within the policy.142 
 
 132. See Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 976, 977–78 
(7th Cir. 2007) (applying Illinois law). But see Fischer, supra note 84, at 1008–09 
(questioning whether the fact that insurance contracts are adhesive has anything to do with 
why courts have devised unique rules for insurance policies). 
 133. Parol evidence is evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements 
that modify the terms of a writing that the parties had intended to be a final and complete 
contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981).  This type of evidence is 
usually prohibited under the parol evidence rule. See id. 
 134. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. UNR Indus., No. 92 Civ. 4236, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17295, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1994) (permitting the inclusion of drafting materials and 
interpretive guidelines into evidence); Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 533, 537 
(Md. 2000) (allowing extrinsic evidence such as dictionaries). 
 135. Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 
327–28 (1986) (asserting that the reasoning behind the rule is that the insurer has complete 
control over the terms of the contract and, therefore, should be held solely responsible for 
any ambiguity). 
 136. Contra proferentum means that in cases of ambiguity, the contract shall be 
interpreted against the drafter. Fischer, supra note 84, at 1002. 
 137. Rahdert, supra note 135, at 328. 
 138. See id. at 325–26. 
 139. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provision, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). 
 140. Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable Expectations After Thirty 
Years:  A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425, 427 (1998). 
 141. See Randall, supra note 87, at 111–18 (noting that only Alaska and Hawaii still 
strictly adhere to the original doctrine formulation). 
 142. See id. at 114–18 (claiming that the application of the insured’s reasonable 
expectations in this manner does not constitute an application of the original doctrine at all). 
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Although this version of the doctrine does incorporate some textual 
analysis, a court’s reasoning varies greatly when applying any reasonable 
expectations doctrine as compared to a purely textual analysis.143  
Underlying policy considerations play a role when any variation of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine is applied.144 
The basic purpose of the reasonable expectations doctrine is to protect 
the layman.145  Consumers depend on insurance agents to sell them a policy 
that adequately serves their needs.146  Purchasers of insurance are most 
often unable to relay to insurers every specific circumstance for which they 
seek coverage.147  Instead, they rely on the insurance agent to use his 
judgment and knowledge of the product in fashioning a comprehensive 
insurance policy.148  The reasonable expectations doctrine ensures that 
insurers do not take advantage of this situation and that insurance policies 
cover events that the insured wanted to be covered when the transaction 
took place.149 
With this in mind, the extent to which the insured reads the contract is 
not the deciding factor for courts that apply the reasonable expectations 
doctrine.150  Insurers know that policyholders will not read their contracts 
and, consequently, even clear language should not be enough to overrule 
consumer expectations.151  However, the insurer may be able to avoid this 
issue if it brings the terms in question to the attention of the insured at the 
time of contracting.152 
Another interpretive rule that favors insureds derives from the general 
contract theory that specific provisions control general ones when there is 
any perceived conflict between the two.153  However, in insurance 
contracts, this rule is often applied only if the specific provision would 
 
 143. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) 
(finding that the exclusion clause is ambiguous and “intent” swallows “expected”, yet still 
determining that an act of self-defense is an intended act by definition), with RAM Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Meyer, 768 N.W.2d 399, 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an act must be 
“wrongful, willful, and egregious” to be excluded because such a definition of intent is more 
reasonable in light of the policy’s overarching purpose). But see Popik & Quackenbos, supra 
note 140, at 429 (asserting that an ambiguity-based variation of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine is equivalent to the rule of contra proferentem). 
 144. See, e.g., RAM Mut. Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d at 406. 
 145. See Keeton, supra note 139, at 967–68. 
 146. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 546–47 (analogizing the reasonable expectations 
doctrine to the implied warranty of fitness for intended purpose as applied to the sale of 
tangible goods). 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See, e.g., AMCO Ins. Co. v. Wehde, No. 05-0503, 2006 WL 650234, at *5 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Mar. 15, 2006). 
 150. See Keeton, supra note 139, at 967–68. 
 151. Id. at 968.  This reasoning may even be implicitly applied to situations in which 
courts claim to come to a decision based on ambiguity within the contract. See id. at 972 
(claiming that courts have “invented ambiguity” in insurance policies to reach a decision on 
reasonable expectations). 
 152. Id. at 968. 
 153. Fischer, supra note 84, at 1003. 
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expand the policy’s coverage.154  Furthermore, the policy will be construed 
broadly while exclusions will be construed narrowly.155  In general, courts 
have exhibited a strong preference for protecting the insured whenever 
possible.156 
D.  The Role of Government in Insurance Interpretation 
Perhaps unlike other adhesion contracts, the government has a strong 
interest in the insurance industry and its health.157  Insurance plays an 
important socioeconomic role by managing the risks that come with every 
facet of life.158  By managing these risks, the insurance industry lightens the 
government’s burden of assisting individuals who suffer tremendous 
financial losses because of unforeseeable accidents.159  In fact, one could 
even argue that modern society could not function without insurance.160 
As a result, state statutes and regulations heavily influence the form and 
substance of insurance contracts.161  All states require insurers to file and 
obtain approval of their policy forms from the appropriate state 
governmental entity before being eligible to issue policies within that 
state.162  Policy inspectors are instructed to disapprove contract forms that 
are ambiguous, misleading, unfair to the consumer, against public policy, or 
in opposition to traditional principles of contractual equity.163  Nonetheless, 
courts have generally not deferred to the government’s approval, nor even 
acknowledged in their holdings that this process exists.164 
These statutes also provide for specific objective standards to which 
insurance policies must adhere.165  Policies must be in plain language so 
that an ordinary consumer will not have trouble reading it.166  The 
readability of a policy includes the style and font size along with the overall 
 
 154. Id. But see Samuels v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 592 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991) (holding that a provision in a booklet provided to the insured that conflicted with 
the policy and would have expanded coverage was not controlling). 
 155. White v. W. Title Ins., 710 P.2d 309, 313 (Cal. 1985); Blaylock v. Am. Guar. Bank 
Liab. Ins. Co., 632 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. 1982). 
 156. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1008–30; Telford F. Hollman, Insurance As a 
Contract of Adhesion, 1978 INS. L.J. 274, 279. 
 157. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy As Social Instrument and Social 
Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495–1513, 1556–57 (2010). 
 158. See id. at 1497–1502. 
 159. See id. at 1556–57 (referring specifically to accidental death/injury insurance). 
 160. Id. at 1497–98 (noting that an individual must have the proper type of insurance for 
many common activities such as obtaining a mortgage or driving a car); see also Rahdert, 
supra note 135, at 377 (noting that the government has always monitored the insurance 
industry closely because of its importance to society). 
 161. Stempel, supra note 157, at 1496; see also 1 APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 2.04. 
 162. Randall, supra note 87, at 127; e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.410 (West 2004); N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 2307(b) (McKinney 2009). 
 163. See Randall, supra note 87, at 140–41. 
 164. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 165. See Randall, supra note 87, at 127–29. 
 166. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4145 (specifying that the text of the policy must 
achieve a minimum score based on a test that accounts for the number of words and syllables 
present in the policy). 
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appearance of the document.167  In addition, these statutes regulate the 
manner in which the insurer presents the policy to the insured.168  When a 
policy falls short of any legislatively imposed standard, courts will enforce 
a statute’s mandate on the insurer.169 
E.  Freedom of Contract and Self-Defense 
Of course, when ruling on insurance cases, many courts do much more 
than simply interpret the text of the contract and follow statutes.170  The 
question of whether acts of self-defense fall within the parameters of 
intentional injury exclusion clauses can be viewed as a question of public 
policy.171  In fact, it would be fair to say that this determination largely 
comes down to a battle of two of the most important principles in all of law:  
self-defense and freedom of contract.  This presents a difficult choice that 
has resulted in differing court opinions.172 
This decision is complicated by the leeway given to the insured when the 
court is initially determining if the assertion of self-defense can continue to 
be put forth at trial.173  Consequently, if the insured claims to have acted in 
self-defense, and the court determines that acts of self-defense are not 
excluded, the insurer must represent the insured throughout the length of 
the trial.174  The insurer may end up representing a person who, in 
hindsight, it had no obligation to defend in the first place.175  For these 
reasons, courts’ decisions on this topic have tremendous importance. 
The concept of self-defense is a familiar one from criminal law176 that 
likely needs little explanation, but its importance should be emphasized.  
Self-defense is commonly defined as a privilege by which an actor is 
entitled to use reasonable force to defend himself against unprivileged, 
harmful, or offensive contact.177  “Self-defense is a basic right, recognized 
 
 167. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04(a)(2)–(3) (LexisNexis 2010); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 33-15-337(4) to (5) (2009). 
 168. See ALA. CODE § 27-14-19(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (specifying that the policy must be 
mailed to the insured within a reasonable amount of time upon its issuance); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-24-14 (2009). 
 169. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92, 104 (Colo. 1995); Matland v. 
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 417 A.2d 46, 51–52 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). 
 170. See infra Part II.B. 
 171. See infra Part II.B. 
 172. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) 
(holding that an act of self-defense is excluded), with Stoebner v. S.D. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co., 598 N.W.2d 557, 559–60 (S.D. 1999) (holding that an act of self-defense did not 
preclude coverage). 
 173. See infra notes 247–49. But see Deakyne v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 728 A.2d 569, 
571 (Del. 1997) (explaining that the court first analyzes if there is credible evidence to 
support the insured’s claim of self-defense when the insurer disputes his duty to defend). 
 174. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
 176. The law of self-defense is the same in both civil and criminal trials aside from the 
reasonable doubt standard used in criminal trials. Smith v. Lauritzen, 356 F.2d 171, 176 (3d 
Cir. 1966) (applying Pennsylvania law); Gibbons v. Berlin, 162 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Tex. App. 
2005). 
 177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (1965). 
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by many legal systems from ancient times to the present, and . . . is ‘the 
central component’ of the Second Amendment right.”178  In addition, it is 
universally accepted as a justification for certain types of crimes and 
torts.179  In a civil suit, a person acting in self-defense will escape liability 
from damages that he caused.180  An attempt to restrict the concept of self-
defense could be seen as an attempt to strip citizens of an innate right.181 
Freedom of contract is the idea that citizens “‘shall have the utmost 
liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and 
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of 
justice.’”182  Freedom of contract is the embodiment of three related 
liberties wrapped up into one:  the freedom of choice, the freedom from 
governmental interference, and the right to have the government enforce 
private agreements.183  However, the freedom of contract is not just a 
liberty based on theoretical beliefs about individual rights.184  It is largely 
viewed as an integral factor in sustaining a functional free market 
system.185  In a free market economy, markets function most efficiently 
when people are free to pursue their interests as they see fit.186  To achieve 
this, individuals must be able to choose their contracting partners and the 
terms of their agreements.187  As a result, “it is a matter of great public 
concern that freedom of contract be not lightly interfered with.”188 
II.  THE STATE COURT SPLIT ON INTENTIONAL INJURY 
EXCLUSION CLAUSES AND SELF-DEFENSE 
Intentional injury exclusion clauses are most commonly worded to 
exclude from coverage any injury or damage that was “intended or 
expected” from the insured’s viewpoint.189  This broad language has left it 
up to courts to interpret whether self-defense falls within the exclusion.190  
 
 178. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3023 (2010) (quoting District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)). 
 179. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 69 (2012). 
 180. Touchet v. Hampton, 950 So. 2d 895, 899 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Richardson v. 
McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (Md. 2000); Beville v. Mac K. Falls, Inc., 619 P.2d 958, 960 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1980). 
 181. See Scribner v. Beach, 4 Denio 448, 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (describing self-
defense as a “primary law of nature”). 
 182. Kessler, supra note 73, at 631 (quoting Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. 
Sampson, (1875) 19 L.R.Eq. 462 at 465 (Eng.)). 
 183. Randall, supra note 87, at 122–23. 
 184. Kessler, supra note 73, at 630. 
 185. Id.; see also Caroline R. Fredrickson, Freedom of Contract and the Remedy of 
Forced Hiring:  A Comparative Assessment of German and American Anti-Discrimination 
Law, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (1995). 
 186. Fredrickson, supra note 185, at 4. 
 187. See id. at 4–5. 
 188. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927). 
 189. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232, 236 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that the exclusion did not apply to expected injuries prior to 
1966); e.g., ALLSTATE INS. CO., supra note 17, at 16. 
 190. See Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 243–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) 
(summarizing the varying interpretations of intentional injury exclusion clauses that other 
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When determining if acts of self-defense are covered under an insurance 
policy, courts will either make a determination of the parties’ intent based 
solely on a textual interpretation of the contract, or they will also 
incorporate public policy considerations into their interpretations.191  Part II 
of this Note analyzes the reasoning that courts and commentators have 
applied within both of these categories. 
A.  Textual Analysis 
This section discusses how courts have interpreted the text of intentional 
injury exclusion clauses as well as the consequences that each interpretation 
has on individuals seeking coverage for acts of self-defense.  The analysis 
will mirror the two steps that courts undergo when reaching a decision.  
This section begins with an inquiry into whether the term “expected” 
broadens the exclusion clause or if it is merely swallowed by the term 
“intended.”  Courts may determine this through their own reasoning,192 or 
by finding the intentional injury exclusion clauses are ambiguous.193  The 
final step is to establish a definition for “intended” and, if necessary, 
“expected” and apply them to the act of self-defense.194  Although the 
answers for either of these steps are not necessarily perfect indications of 
how courts have ruled, the reasoning behind the answers establishes the 
foundation for both the insured’s and insurer’s arguments. 
1.  Intended Versus Expected 
The question of whether the term “expected” broadens an intentional 
injury exclusion clause may be pivotal in determining if acts of self-defense 
fall within the exclusion.  The broader the range of actions that fall within 
the exclusion clause, the less likely it is that a court will find that an act of 
self-defense is covered by the insurance policy.195 
One way that courts decide if “intended” and “expected” are synonymous 
is by simply applying their own logic to the argument.196  Some courts have 
held that the terms are synonymous because expectations are part of 
intentions.197  After all, “one expects the consequences of what one 
 
courts have made). But see Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1298–99 (noting that some insurance 
policies explicitly address self-defense claims). 
 191. See Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law:  Dusting off the 
Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1038 (1991) (recognizing that courts will 
approach insurance contracts in either a legal formalist or functionalist manner). 
 192. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 734 N.E.2d 50, 57 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
 193. See, e.g., Neilsen 332 N.E.2d at 243–44. 
 194. See, e.g., id. 
 195. See Henry A. Hentemann, “Expected or Intended”:  What Does It Mean, 46 INS. 
COUNS. J. 331, 332 (1979). 
 196. See Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 734 N.E.2d at 57. 
 197. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Neb. 1973); Erie 
Ins. Exch. v. Muff, 851 A.2d 919, 927–28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding that both terms 
connote an element of conscious awareness). 
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intends.”198  Therefore, for these courts, there is no reason to expand on the 
high degree of certainty that is associated with intent.199  Other courts have 
held that adding in an element of foreseeability, which is usually associated 
with the term “expected,” would unnecessarily complicate the analysis.200  
Taking foreseeability into account does not help the court to define the 
parties’ aims in agreeing to the contract.201 
On the other hand, courts that hold that these terms are not synonymous 
justify their holdings by referencing the history of the exclusion’s 
language.202  Before 1966, the term “expected” was not included in the 
exclusion clause.203  Scholars who support the insurers’ position feel that 
the only possible reason for this is that the term was added to broaden the 
exclusion and to presumably exclude damages that are reasonably 
foreseeable to the insured.204  If it were not added to expand the exclusion, 
there would be no reason to have both “intended” and “expected” in the 
clause.205  No matter what a court ultimately determines to be the specific 
definition of “expected,” a lesser degree of proof is required to show 
expected injury than intended injury.206 
2.  Ambiguity 
When courts are not applying their own theories to the textual 
interpretation of insurance contracts, they often apply the same rules of 
construction that they would apply to any other contract.207  Perhaps the 
most basic rule of contract interpretation is not to rewrite a contract when 
its terms are unambiguous.208  However, any ambiguous terminology is to 
 
 198. Muth, 207 N.W.2d at 366 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 799, 1175 (unabr. ed. 1968)); see also Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. 
Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 807 (W. Va. 2001) (holding that the exclusion provided that 
the act must be intentional and the damage must be expected, thereby clarifying the need to 
show subjective intent on the part of the insured). 
 199. See Muth, 207 N.W.2d at 366. 
 200. See id. (noting that such a rule is difficult to apply to case facts); United Servs. Auto. 
Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 987 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
 201. See Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987 (describing foreseeability as a technical legal concept). 
 202. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232, 
236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Hentemann, supra note 195, at 332. But see James A. Fischer, The Exclusion 
from Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured:  A Policy 
in Search of a Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 125–26 (1990) (noting that while 
this approach would make sense linguistically, allowing “intended” and “expected” to take 
on separate meanings would create unintended consequences that run counter to public 
policy, such as excluding negligent acts from policy coverage). 
 205. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 734 N.E.2d 50, 57 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2000); John Dwight Ingram, The “Expected or Intended” Exclusion Clause in 
Liability Insurance Policies:  What Should It Exclude?, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 713, 715 
(1992) (acknowledging that this interpretation is consistent with the rule of contract that no 
word should be ignored if it can serve a reasonable purpose). 
 206. See Tri-S Corp. v. W. World Ins. Co. 135 P.3d 82, 103 n.8 (Haw. 2006); Am. Acad. 
of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 734 N.E.2d at 57; Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d at 236. 
 207. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 208. See Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). 
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be resolved against the contract drafter (the insurer).209  Ultimately, a 
contract is unambiguous when it can be given a definite legal meaning or 
interpretation.210  While this definition seems straightforward, determining 
what constitutes ambiguous terminology is a little more complex. 
Generally, courts have viewed the question of contractual ambiguity 
using either a contextual plain meaning approach211 or a reasonable person 
standard.212  The method that courts choose largely determines whether the 
intentional injury exclusion clause is found to be ambiguous.213  If there is 
ambiguity, the clause will be read in favor of the insured, making it more 
likely that acts of self-defense would be covered by the policy.214 
a.  Contextual Plain Meaning View 
In those jurisdictions that choose to implement a plain meaning approach, 
courts only focus on the terms within the contract and, if necessary, the 
circumstances under which the contract was formed.215  Vaguely defined 
terms, coupled with evidence that the parties had different understandings 
of the meaning of the terms, would constitute ambiguity.216  Also, 
ambiguity can be found where the contents of different sections within the 
contract contradict one another.217 
When interpreted in this manner, intentional injury exclusion clauses are 
usually viewed as unambiguous.218  While courts may have differing 
opinions regarding the precise definitions of “intended” and “expected,”219 
these terms are far from obscure for the layman.220  Furthermore, as the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi articulated in United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co. v. Omnibank,221 the exclusion clause is perfectly consistent 
with the overarching premise that insurance policies are meant to cover 
 
 209. Stone Container Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 165 F.3d 
1157, 1161–62 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law and noting that this rule has greater 
force in the insurance setting). 
 210. Lopez-Franco v. Hernandez, 351 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App. 2011). 
 211. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Omnibank, 812 So. 2d 196, 199–200 (Miss. 
2002). 
 212. See, e.g., Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d at 243–44. 
 213. Compare Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Thrift-Mart, Inc., 285 S.E.2d 566, 571 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1981), with United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 986–89 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986). 
 214. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Poomaihealani, 667 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. 
Haw. 1987) (applying Hawaii law); Bamert v. Johnson, 909 So. 2d 705, 709–10 (La. Ct. 
App. 2005). But see Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d at 243–44 (holding that self-defense was not 
covered by the policy even though the exclusion clause was read in favor of the insured). 
 215. See Thrift-Mart, 285 S.E.2d at 571–72; Omnibank, 812 So. 2d at 199–200. 
 216. Thrift-Mart, 285 S.E.2d at 571. 
 217. See Omnibank, 812 So. 2d at 199–200. 
 218. See, e.g., id. But see N. Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 125 F.3d 983, 986–87 (6th Cir. 
1997) (applying Michigan law and holding that an insurance policy that lists a number of 
intentional torts as covered by the policy yet also incorporates an intentional injury exclusion 
clause is inherently ambiguous). 
 219. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 220. See Thrift-Mart, 285 S.E.2d at 571–72. 
 221. 812 So. 2d  at 196. 
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“occurrences.”222  Occurrences are defined as accidents, and accidents 
produce unintended and unexpected results.223  Therefore, expected or 
intended injury from the standpoint of the insured cannot be the result of an 
accident and is not covered by the terms of the policy.224  In the end, a 
finding that the clause is unambiguous will usually favor the insurer as both 
the terms “intentional” and “expected” will be applied.225 
b.  Reasonable Interpretation View 
In those jurisdictions that do not follow the plain meaning approach, 
courts make a determination of ambiguity by ascertaining if there is more 
than one reasonable interpretation of the language in question.226  This 
threshold is easily satisfied with respect to intentional injury exclusion 
clauses, because courts around the country have reached many different 
holdings when interpreting the impact that this clause has on insurance 
coverage.227  Once this threshold has been met, the court will interpret the 
clause in a way that is most favorable to the insured.228  This may mean that 
the narrower standard of intent to injure must be shown to exclude the 
resulting injury from coverage.229  Alternatively, the court may simply 
determine that imposing upon the insurer the duty to cover acts of self-
defense is the most favorable reading of the exclusion clause.230 
3.  Definition of Intent 
When a court finds that the insured’s actions will be excluded only if 
they were intentional, the court’s definition of intent almost always 
determines whether an act of self-defense is excluded.231  While this 
definition varies between jurisdictions, seemingly all courts agree that the 
 
 222. Id. at 199–200. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. at 200. 
 225. See Thrift-Mart, 285 S.E.2d at 572 (holding that where there is no ambiguity, the 
only issue in the case is to apply the insured’s actions to the plain meaning of the policy). 
 226. See George v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 480, 489 (Ct. App. 2011); 
Bamert v. Johnson, 909 So. 2d 705, 709–10 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (using the fact that the law 
is unsettled in relation to self-defense as an indication of ambiguity). 
 227. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 243–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); United 
Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 986–89 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“[A] term is 
ambiguous only ‘if reasonably intelligent men on considering it in the context of the entire 
policy would honestly differ as to its meaning.’” (quoting Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 389, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986))). 
 228. See Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987. But see Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d at 244 (interpreting the 
clause in a manner that is most favorable to the insured yet ruling against him). 
 229. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d at 243–44. 
 230. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Poomaihealani, 667 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Haw. 
1987); Bamert, 909 So. 2d at 709–10. 
 231. See, e.g., Poomaihealani, 667 F. Supp. at 709; Bamert, 909 So. 2d at 709–10. But 
see Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 809 (W. Va. 2001) 
(construing the purpose of self-defense in such a way that there would be no intent to injure 
under any definition). 
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injury itself must be intended, not the act.232  This protects the insured from 
being denied coverage when the harm caused was a complete accident.233  
This reasoning also protects the insured when the type or magnitude of 
injury that results is different from what was anticipated.234 
Moreover, even the basic definition of intent as applied to exclusion 
clauses is designed to protect the insured.235  “Absent exceptional 
circumstances that objectively establish the insured’s intent to injure, [a 
court] will look to the insured’s subjective intent to determine intent to 
injure.”236  While courts differ on what constitutes “exceptional 
circumstances,” this quote accurately describes a court’s baseline 
application of “intended” as it is used in the exclusion clause.237 
a.  Straightforward Approach 
In some jurisdictions, applying subjective intent to an act of self-defense 
leads to the direct conclusion that such an act is intentional and, therefore, 
excluded from coverage.238  For example, in Home Insurance Co. v. 
Neilsen,239 the Court of Appeals of Indiana held that when the insured 
delivered a deliberate blow to his neighbor’s face, the insured was not 
entitled to coverage even if he did not start the fight.240  The court held that 
a claim of self-defense only goes towards motive or justification, which is 
not contemplated within the exclusion clause.241 
Courts that follow this line of reasoning have held that a person acting in 
self-defense subjectively desires to inflict harm upon another individual.242  
Consequently, that person intended his actions and falls within the 
exclusion clause.243  The overarching goal of protecting oneself is 
 
 232. See West ex rel. West v. Watson, 799 So. 2d 1189, 1191 n.2 (La. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting that the provision is an intentional injury exclusion, not an intentional act exclusion); 
Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987. 
 233. See Hentemann, supra note 195, at 332 (using an example where an individual’s 
decision to speed may be intentional, but even if she has a car accident and injures another 
person, she did not intend any harm). 
 234. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987; see also Berlekamp Plastics, Inc. v. Buckeye Union Ins. 
Co., 705 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the particular resulting injury 
must have been intended). But see Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Purvis, 444 S.E.2d 109, 
110 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“[S]uch an exclusion is applicable . . . even if the actual, resulting 
injury is different either in kind or magnitude from that intended or expected.” (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Stein v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 324 S.E.2d 510, 511 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1984)). 
 235. Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1265 (N.J. 1992). 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 611–14 (Minn. 2001) (holding 
that “intent” includes actual intent to injure in addition to actions where harm is so 
substantially certain that such actions may be classified as intentional as a matter of law). 
 238. See Clemmons v. Am. States Ins. Co., 412 So. 2d 906, 909–10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982); Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). 
 239. 332 N.E.2d  at 240. 
 240. Id. at 244. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See, e.g., Clemmons, 412 So. 2d at 909. 
 243. See id. at 909–10. 
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completely detached from the act and immediate result of injuring the initial 
aggressor.244 
b.  Nuanced Interpretation 
Nevertheless, the definition of intent can become muddled when a few 
key issues are taken into account.  Courts must decide to what extent they 
will entertain the assertion that the act of the insured was not conscious and, 
therefore, could not be intentional.245  In terms of self-defense, the answer 
to this question is very important, as some courts have accepted the theory 
that self-defense can be a reflex.246 
For instance, in Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. v. Walukiewicz,247 the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that an insured that grabbed an 
individual and tossed him off a porch and down a flight of steps was 
allowed to present evidence that his actions were in self-defense.248  
Furthermore, the court indicated that if the insured could show that he acted 
in self-defense, he would be entitled to coverage under his insurance 
policy.249  Courts that apply this reasoning hold that as long as the insured 
justifiably reacted within a short period of time, he cannot be charged with 
any intent as contemplated by the exclusion clause.250 
Another interpretive issue courts face is whether a person acting in self-
defense actually desires to injure the attacker.  A number of courts have 
held that an individual in such a situation is not acting for the purpose of 
injuring anyone.251  Rather, a person acting in self-defense is acting with 
the intent to protect himself.252  The individual has been thrust into a 
situation he had no control over, and is merely attempting to avoid harm.253  
 
 244. See id. (finding little difference between a person injuring another in self-defense 
and a robber who shot and attempted to kill his pursuers). 
 245. Compare Eubanks v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 393 S.E.2d 452, 455 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that the insured’s insanity does not negate his intent as a matter of law), 
with Inzinna v. Walcott, 868 So. 2d 721, 726 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (allowing a determination 
of consciousness to be litigated). 
 246. See Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d 672, 682 (Conn. 2009) (holding that 
acts of self-defense are “by their very nature instinctive, spontaneous and unplanned”); 
Inzinna, 868 So. 2d at 726 (recognizing that “the instinct of self-preservation is primordial”); 
W. Fire Ins. Co. v. Persons, 393 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding self-
defense to be consistent with an accident as defined in the insurance policy). But see 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 911 F. Supp. 230, 231, 234 (S.D. Miss. 1995) 
(holding that when the insured saw his mother being pushed and came to her defense, he was 
not acting under an involuntary impulse). 
 247. 966 A.2d at 672. 
 248. Id. at 674, 683–84. 
 249. See id. at 682–83. 
 250. See id.; Inzinna, 868 So. 2d at 726. But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Marshall, 
554 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 1989) (holding that because both assault and self-defense are often 
impulsive and reactive, and assault falls within the exclusion, so should self-defense). 
 251. Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 809–10 (W. 
Va. 2001); see also Watkins v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Ark. 
2009); Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d at 682; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Novak, 313 N.W.2d 636, 640–41 
(Neb. 1981). 
 252. Novak, 313 N.W.2d at 640–41. 
 253. See Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d at 682. 
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As a result, these courts focus on the insured’s principal intent of protecting 
himself.254  This approach would force insurers to cover acts of self-defense 
in spite of an intentional injury exclusion clause.255 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska illustrated this approach in Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Novak.256  In Novak, the insured struck a neighbor’s friend 
with his fist, or possibly a beer bottle, causing injury.257  However, the 
insured claimed that he only did so because the victim urinated in his yard, 
hurled obscenities at him and his wife, and began to make sudden 
movements towards him.258  The court determined that a reasonable jury 
could find that the insured acted in self-defense with the intent of 
preventing harm to himself and his wife.259  Consequently, the insurer was 
ordered to represent him in the underlying lawsuit.260 
4.  Definition of Expected 
While the definition of “intended” provides support for some arguments 
made by insureds acting in self-defense, the presence of the term 
“expected”261 may serve to rebut these arguments.262  The common 
definition of an expected consequence is one that is more likely to happen 
than not.263  However, many courts that have interpreted an intentional 
injury exclusion clause to include an insured’s expectations have decided to 
apply a narrower definition.264  With that said, courts that recognize the 
exclusion of expected injuries agree that a lesser degree of proof is needed 
to show expectation as opposed to intention.265 
Applying this more relaxed standard to intentional injury exclusion 
clauses impacts how courts view self-defense in this context.266  For 
 
 254. See id. 
 255. See, e.g., id. 
 256. 313 N.W.2d at 636. 
 257. Id. at 637. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 640–43. 
 260. Id. at 642. 
 261. Most, if not all, intentional injury exclusion clauses include the word “expected.” 
See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 262. See Century Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paddock, 425 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that even if the insured acted in self-defense, the injuries that he caused were to be 
expected, and therefore, he is barred from coverage). 
 263. See Hentemann, supra note 195, at 331–32 (citing various dictionaries that define 
“expected” events as those which are probable to occur). 
 264. See Zelda, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 361 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(requiring that the injury was planned or foreseen with some certainty by the insured to fall 
within the exclusion); Tri-S Corp. v. W. World Ins. Co., 135 P.3d 82, 103 n.8 (Haw. 2006) 
(holding that high probability is not enough for the lesser “expected” standard); Farm Bureau 
Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) 
(holding that the insured must be found to have realized or should have realized a strong 
probability of the consequences). But see Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d 
839, 842 (Mich. 1997) (holding that the exclusion clause covered injuries that the insured 
was aware were likely to follow from his conduct). 
 265. See Tri-S Corp. 135 P.3d at 103 n.8; Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d at 236. 
 266. See, e.g., Paddock, 425 N.W.2d at 217. 
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example, in Century Mutual Insurance Co. v. Paddock,267 the insureds were 
involved in a bar fight that they claimed to have fought in self-defense.268  
As a result of the fight, the insureds allegedly caused the other parties to 
sustain a broken leg, a fractured eye socket, and a fractured ankle.269  
Despite their claim of self-defense, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held 
that because the injuries were “‘natural, anticipated and expected 
result[s]’”270 of the insureds’ intentional acts of fighting, they were barred 
from coverage.271 
For those jurisdictions where expected injuries are excluded, whether the 
insured desired the results of his actions is irrelevant.272  Similarly, the fact 
that the insured acted based on reflex is also inconsequential.273  If the 
insured should have reasonably anticipated that his actions would cause 
injury, his actions fall within the exclusion clause.274  Courts have applied 
this principle on motions of summary judgment involving shootings,275 
punches,276 and kicks277 that were made in self-defense.  Courts at times 
also apply this same principle based on a theory that certain actions are 
intentional as a matter of law.278 
B.  Public Policy Concerns 
A court may decide to include public policy reasoning alongside, or in 
lieu of, its textual analysis.  This section analyzes how courts and 
commentators have contemplated the importance of self-defense and 
freedom of contract, the pragmatic effects of adhesive insurance policies, 
and the role of state legislatures when resolving the self-defense coverage 
issue.279 
 
 267. 425 N.W.2d at 214. 
 268. Id. at 215–16. 
 269. Id. at 215. 
 270. Id. at 217 (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 407 N.W.2d 27, 28 (Mich. 
Ct. App.1987)). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d 839, 842–43 (Mich. 1997). 
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1.  Protecting the Right to Self-Defense 
Perhaps the most obvious policy concern that courts address in this 
context stems from the idea that self-defense should never be 
discouraged.280  Self-defense constitutes a basic right and it has been argued 
that this right needs to be protected in all contexts.281  Proponents of such 
arguments contend that a person acting in self-defense should not be liable 
for damages caused.282  To protect this traditional notion, courts have often 
held that intentional injury exclusion clauses only exclude those acts that 
are inherently wrongful.283 
For example, in Deakyne v. Selective Insurance Co. of America,284 the 
Superior Court of Delaware held that the exclusion only applies to tortious 
conduct as defined under state law.285  The court asserted that the exclusion 
clause was specifically designed to only apply to tortious conduct without 
explaining why this was so.286  When applied to acts of self-defense, this 
test led the court to a straightforward conclusion.287  Self-defense does not 
constitute a tortious act, because the insured “has not illegally infringed on 
the rights of another.”288  Consequently, the exclusion clause did not apply 
and the insured was covered under the policy.289 
Critics of this line of reasoning are quick to point out that the judiciary 
should not make such decisions based on what it believes is a fair 
outcome.290  They argue that public policy decisions are best left to the 
legislature.291  These critics adhere to the notion that courts should act as a 
voice of the people only in extreme cases that garner virtual unanimity of 
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opinion.292  Furthermore, scholars favoring insurers argue that the insurance 
industry should not be burdened with the financial costs that arise with 
attempting to preserve the right to self-defense on a case-by-case basis.293  
Ultimately, they believe that such a complex wealth transfer that affects an 
entire industry should be left in the hands of elected policymakers.294 
In addition, some courts that have ruled in favor of insurers have held 
that although self-defense is important, it must be excluded for pragmatic 
reasons.295  An insurer is obligated to defend the insured where the 
underlying complaint creates the reasonable possibility that the insured’s 
actions will be covered.296  Avoiding its obligation to defend the insured is 
very difficult,297 and the insurer must continue to defend until all theories of 
recovery are exhausted.298  Given the difficulty that often comes with 
determining who started a fight,299 all parties are likely to claim self-
defense.300  In the end, some courts and scholars have asserted that 
insurance companies would litigate more cases, their costs would increase, 
and these costs would inevitably be passed on to consumers in the wasteful 
form of increased premiums.301 
2.  Maintaining the Freedom of Contract 
Furthermore, the court highlighted in Neilsen that by focusing on the 
need to protect acts of self-defense, one can lose sight of the importance of 
the right to freely contract.302  One of the basic principles of contract law is 
that the best way to interpret the intent of the parties is by reading the terms 
of the contract.303  A bad bargain does not get a party out of the contract 
that he agreed to.304  Moreover, the public’s confidence that the courts will 
adhere to these principles is essential for a free market system to 
function.305  For example, the Neilsen court stressed that the freedom of 
contract is an important public policy in its own right and it should not be 
forgotten within the context of insurance contracts.306 
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On the contrary, those that support the insured’s view find that the 
principle of freedom of contract has its flaws in the context of intentional 
injury exclusion clauses.307  If the concept of foreseeability is incorporated 
into the exclusion clause, almost any act can be viewed as intentional or 
expected.308  Then, the decision depends on how far a judge will stretch the 
concept of foreseeability.309  According to this line of reasoning, strict 
adherence to the contract would defeat the purpose of insurance, and any 
interpretation would just be guesswork.310 
Others believe that contractual freedom no longer exists in the insurance 
industry.311  State insurance codes are extensive and they control insurance 
policies to a point that severely limits freedom of contract for both 
parties.312  As such, some feel that it would be foolish for courts to attempt 
to interpret the will of the parties because their will is not expressed in the 
contract.313  Those that adhere to this thought process believe that judges 
should interpret insurance policies in a way that recognizes the important 
public policies that justified the insurance regulations in the first place.314 
3.  Classifying Modern Insurance Contracts As Adhesive 
 A contract that is believed to be adhesive is often scrutinized more 
harshly than other contracts.315  Consequently, classifying an insurance 
policy as adhesive can have a major impact on how exclusion clauses are 
interpreted.  This section summarizes the opposing views on whether 
insurance policies are, in fact, adhesive. 
a.  The Classical View of Insurance Policies 
Some scholars feel that exclusion clauses cannot be interpreted on text 
alone because insurance policies are standardized contracts of adhesion.316  
As such, they create a lack of choice for the consumer, and make it very 
difficult for the insured to understand the terms of the agreement.317  
Moreover, consumers often struggle to uncover any policy coverage details 
before actually purchasing insurance.318  In the end, those who support this 
view believe that textual interpretation is often fruitless and policy 
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considerations, such as protecting acts of self-defense, should heavily 
influence a court’s decision.319 
According to this line of reasoning, traditional contractual interpretation 
is useless because insurance policies are not contracts in the traditional 
sense of the word.320  As a result, an argument can be made that the plain 
text of a clause should only be controlling where there is an expression of 
joint consent in its inclusion in the contract.321  However, based on the 
circumstances of how insurance policies are purchased, joint consent does 
not exist for any portion of the contract.322  Consequently, the terms of the 
transactions must be judged on other standards as the courts see fit.323 
b.  Modern Flavor View 
While it may be difficult for consumers to obtain insurance policy 
information, this does not mean that knowledgeable buyers cannot shop 
around and possibly bargain for certain terms.324  This may hold especially 
true in light of the changes that the insurance industry continues to go 
through.  Currently, the insurance industry is extremely competitive, and it 
has suffered like the rest of the economy due to the recent financial 
recession.325  This has led insurers to seek new ways to generate revenue, 
one of which is through innovative products that can help conform coverage 
to the consumer’s individual needs.326 
In addition, some have asserted that the idea that all modern insurance 
contracts are completely standardized is a myth.327  This is true even with 
respect to self-defense, where some policies expressly include self-defense 
within their coverage.328 
In fact, insurance covering self-defense has gained some national 
attention in light of the highly publicized Florida “stand your ground” case 
 
 319. See Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1343–45; Slawson, supra note 69, at 565–66. 
 320. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 544. 
 321. See id. at 541–42. 
 322. See Rahdert, supra note 135, at 337 & n.44. 
 323. See Slawson, supra note 69, at 550. 
 324. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1017–19 (claiming that the issue created by insurance 
contracts is one of unequal knowledge, not bargaining power). 
 325. See DELOITTE, 2012 GLOBAL INSURANCE OUTLOOK 2–3 (2012), available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/FSI/US_FS
I_Global%20Insurance%20Outlook%202012_011312.pdf; KPMG, INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
OUTLOOK SURVEY 5–8 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/
ArticlesPublications/Documents/2012-insurance-outlook-survey.pdf. 
 326. See DELOITTE, supra note 325, at 12–16; KPMG, supra note 325, at 9. 
 327. Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1274–75, 1308 (“[S]ome companies have particularized 
language in their policies that deviates from the industry norm.”). 
 328. Cochran v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 637 A.2d 509, 511 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) 
(reading the policy to state “Aetna will pay for bodily injury even though it may have been 
intended or expected from the standpoint of the insured if it results from the use of 
reasonable force to protect persons or property” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 1299. 
236 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
involving the death of teenager Trayvon Martin.329  Specifically, the 
National Rifle Association’s endorsement of “stand your ground” insurance 
became a publicized topic of conversation in the national media.330  This 
type of attention may have alerted consumers as to the possibility that 
special coverage would be needed for acts of self-defense.331 
In considering these factors, supporters of the insurer’s position argue 
that courts have put too much emphasis on labeling the insurance policies 
as contracts of adhesion.332  Courts will often not even take into account 
evidence that the insured was capable of bargaining.333  This is done in 
spite of the fact that the last systematic attempt to closely examine the 
content of different insurance policies took place in 1937.334  Critics argue 
that this labeling is largely responsible for the insurance industry’s undue 
financial losses as a result of heightened duties to defend.335 
4.  Legislative Considerations 
Of course, insurance contracts also differ from typical adhesion contracts 
because they are highly regulated.336  Every state requires regulatory review 
and approval of insurance policies prior to their sale.337  The approval of 
policies is controlled by both extensive insurance code requirements and the 
judgment of the regulatory entity.338  This means that state governments 
routinely approve insurance policies that do not specifically provide 
coverage for acts of self-defense.339  However, courts usually do not 
acknowledge that the insurance contract was approved by a governmental 
entity when interpreting the contract’s terms.340  The few courts that have 
done so have differed in their determinations of how much they are bound 
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by regulatory approval.341  This has led to some criticism of the judiciary’s 
approach.342 
a.  Leave It to the Legislature 
Critics have accused courts that use public policy considerations in their 
decisionmaking as taking on a role that is best left to the legislature.343  
State public policy decisions are usually left to the legislature, and some 
scholars argue that the courts should not determine what is fair in a contract 
without clear state legislative or administrative guidelines.344  This is 
especially relevant in the insurance industry, which is so heavily 
regulated.345 
Critics assert that courts are not designed to make these types of 
inquiries.346  They believe that a court cannot make an informed public 
policy judgment based solely on the evidence offered by two parties.347  
Comprehensive evidence that accounts for broad factors, such as economic 
impact, is not likely to come up in a trial between two parties.348  Lastly, 
scholars argue that judges themselves are not equipped to make well-
informed decisions on many of these issues.349  According to this line of 
reasoning, public policy issues, such as insuring self-defense, should be left 
to the legislature.350 
b.  A Role for Judges 
In response, those in favor of judicial policymaking have pointed out the 
inadequacies of an administratively controlled system.351  Perhaps the 
biggest issue is that administrative agencies are unable to keep up with the 
ever-changing insurance marketplace.352  Agencies are often disorganized 
in their record keeping and, as a result, they are unable to understand the 
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changes that insurers are implementing in their policies.353  This has led to 
an inability to “combat[] insurer fine print.”354 
Not only does this lack of organization prevent regulators from making 
informed policy decisions, but it also prevents them from helping 
consumers understand their policies.355  Logically, uninformed consumers 
are more likely to make an ill-advised bargain that, if informed, they may 
not have wanted.356 
Finally, supporters of the insureds’ position have argued that the political 
process that comes with the current system also stifles consumer-oriented 
reform.357  The insurance industry often lobbies legislatures for looser 
guidelines358 because the industry finds governmental regulation as one of 
its greatest barriers to growth.359  This could potentially hurt the insureds’ 
representation in the political arena.360  Ultimately, some scholars feel that 
there is still a need for judges to account for the interests of society when 
deciding insurance contract cases. 
III.  INSURERS SHOULD NOT BE FORCED TO FACE 
THE RISK OF SELF-DEFENSE CLAIMS 
As can been seen from the arguments on both sides, the question of 
whether an act of self-defense falls within an intentional injury exclusion 
clause has no clear “right” answer.  However, this Note contends that the 
best solution for the parties, courts, and society is for courts to exclude acts 
of self-defense when there is a standard intentional exclusion clause in the 
policy.361  This section justifies this conclusion on a number of different 
fronts.  From a purely textual standpoint, a plain reading is all that is needed 
to find that self-defense is excluded.  Additionally, self-defense needs to be 
excluded from a pragmatic viewpoint based on the structure of the 
insurance industry and court procedures.  Finally, the relatively modern 
changes that have shaped insurance contracts support this conclusion. 
A.  Text 
The traditional sentiment within contract law has been that the best way 
to interpret the intent of the contracting parties is to look at the terms of the 
contract.362  Intentional injury exclusion clauses usually prohibit injuries 
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that were “intended or expected” from the standpoint of the insured.363  
This language cannot be any clearer.  First of all, the idea that the term 
“intended” would swallow “expected” is illogical.  Each term has a distinct 
meaning,364 and the use of “or” only serves to accentuate the difference.  If 
this were not the case, why would insurers include both terms?365  In 
response to judicial precedent in the field of insurance contracts, insurers 
included the term “expected,” presumably to broaden the clause.366  
Distinguishing between the terms is the most logical conclusion. 
Some courts have taken the approach that if the exclusion clause is found 
to be ambiguous, they will exclude only intended injuries.367  This is in line 
with applying the reasonable interpretation that most favors the insured.368  
While this seems like a rational formula for interpreting an insurance 
contract, when a court looks for ambiguity based on considerations outside 
of the contract, this method loses its credibility. 
Courts should determine ambiguity based on the structure of the contract, 
a plain reading of the terms, and the context in which the contract was 
formed.369  Finding ambiguity on the basis that other courts have 
interpreted the clause differently370 is circular reasoning.  While different 
interpretations may provide evidence of ambiguity, different interpretations 
do not create ambiguity.  A court should make its own judgment of 
ambiguity based on the terms of the contract,371 not on what other courts, 
which may have taken nontextual considerations into account, may think.372 
When ambiguity is determined properly, the intentional injury exclusion 
clause is unambiguous.373  Virtually everybody buying insurance knows 
what “intended” and “expected” mean, and they know that there is a 
difference between them.374  Also, the exclusion clause is consistent with 
the principle concept of insurance—that insurance is not designed to cover 
acts that the insured controls375—and the fact that policies are only meant to 
cover “occurrences.”376  This leads to the conclusion that the term 
“expected” broadens the exclusion clause to include likely or reasonably 
foreseeable events. 
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In turn, the textual arguments that have been made to exclude acts of self-
defense from the definition of “intended” would have no merit when 
applied to the definition of “expected.”  The idea that individuals acting in 
self-defense are only intending to protect themselves rather than hurt 
anyone would not factor into the discussion.  When a person acts in self-
defense, there is little doubt that he believes he will probably injure his 
attacker, thereby making the injury expected.377  Furthermore, even if self-
defense is characterized as purely reactionary, spontaneous reactions still 
maintain an element of expectation.378  Consequently, self-defense would 
preclude the insured from coverage under a purely textual analysis. 
B.  Pragmatic Reasons 
Even if one were to disagree with this textual approach, the realities of 
the insurance industry, and how society is structured, lead to the same 
conclusion.  Maintaining the health of the insurance industry is very 
important to all of society.379  Often, insurers save their customers from 
financial ruin that could be caused by a number of unforeseeable 
disasters.380  This saves the government from assisting many people who 
would otherwise be on the brink of financial collapse.381  To perform this 
function efficiently, insurers must be able to accurately predict their 
risks.382  Insurers account for risk through the receipt of premiums that are 
subsequently invested.383  An inaccurate calculation of risks could lead to a 
shortage of funds and serious financial problems.384  While a firm standard 
either way would help,385 realistically speaking, only an explicit exclusion 
of acts of self-defense will allow insurers to make accurate predictions of 
risk. 
This is true mainly because of the structure of litigation involving 
insurance companies.  Insurers already have a very difficult time avoiding 
their duty to defend.386  An insurer’s duty to defend is usually determined 
based on a reading of the complaint against the insured, in conjunction with 
a reading of the insurance policy.387  Courts can be very generous to the 
insured regarding this decision.388  Furthermore, the insurer is not relieved 
of this duty until the possibility of recovery is completely eliminated.389 
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This process will only tip even further against the insurer if self-defense 
does not fall within the exclusion clause.  Self-defense is not an easy claim 
to prove, and more importantly, in this context, it is an extremely difficult 
claim to disprove.390  There is nothing to stop the insured from asserting a 
self-defense justification for every physical incident that occurs.391  Even if 
this is only one of the insured’s theories, it would be enough to hold the 
insurer to its duty to defend.392 
Ultimately, this extra litigation only serves to drive up insurers’ 
expenses, and these costs are likely to be passed on to the consumers.393  
When statutory regulations exist that control insurance prices below market 
value,394 insurers may be left with no ability to make a profit from liability 
insurance polices.  In this sense, courts that have enforced coverage for self-
defense have seemingly forgotten that the insurance industry is a private 
market that does not have bottomless pockets. 
One could argue that while these pragmatic reasons show the need for a 
change in the system, they do not support the idea that self-defense should 
be entirely excluded.  After all, self-defense is a basic right and an 
important principle in tort and criminal law.395  Whether implicitly or 
explicitly, courts have been cognizant of this when determining the scope of 
coverage provided by an insurance policy.396 
With this in mind, one can argue that the system used in some courts 
requiring the insured to show credible evidence of self-defense prior to the 
trial397 would significantly reduce the litigation costs while preserving the 
right of self-defense.  While this is partially true, the standard for such a 
determination is whether a reasonable jury could find that the insured was 
acting in self-defense.398  Based on how courts have traditionally viewed an 
insurer’s duty to defend,399 this will likely not be a difficult threshold to 
overcome. 
Furthermore, the underlying fear that the concept of self-defense will 
somehow be tainted is misguided.  While self-defense is a justification, it 
does not give an individual additional rights that he was not entitled to in 
the first place.400  An individual acting in self-defense will not have to pay 
for the damages that he caused, but that is all that self-defense provides—it 
cannot change a contract.401 
 
 390. See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text. 
 391. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 393. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
 394. See Randall, supra note 87, at 126 (“All states authorize rate regulation in some 
form, charging insurance commissioners with ensuring that insurance rates are not excessive, 
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”). 
 395. See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text. 
 396. See supra Part II.B. 
 397. See, e.g., Deakyne v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 728 A.2d 569, 571 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1997). 
 398. See id. 
 399. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 400. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text. 
 401. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text. 
242 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
C.  Adhesion Myth 
More importantly, there is no longer any substantive reason for courts to 
protect insureds from insurers.  The outdated, universally accepted belief 
that insurance contracts are strictly adhesive and provide no choice for the 
consumers simply does not accurately apply to modern policies.402  This is 
particularly true regarding acts of self-defense.403  If an individual wants to 
pay the extra premium so that acts of self-defense are covered, he can find a 
policy that does just that.404  Insurance companies are providing more 
choices for consumers, allowing them to customize their scope of coverage 
now more than ever.405  Unfortunately, courts have grown so accustomed to  
characterizing insurance contracts as adhesive that they lose sight of the 
facts in front of them.406  This misguided perception needs to change. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that insurance policies still maintain some 
adhesive qualities in the form of standardized contracts.407  Customers are 
often not able to dicker over specific terms within the contract.408  This has 
led to the belief that there is a large disparity in bargaining power between 
the two parties.409  However, the reality of the situation is that standardized 
contracts are absolutely necessary for the insurance industry to exist.410  
Risks can be covered with adequate funds only if they are homogenously 
characterized.411  This cannot be accomplished if only a handful of people 
negotiate a self-defense exception into an otherwise standard intentional 
injury exclusion clause.  Consequently, courts should not take a proinsured 
stance simply because “adhesion” has a negative connotation. 
Of course, the aspect of the contracting process that most needs to be 
fixed is the customer’s inability to read the terms of the policy prior to 
agreeing to them.  Not only do consumers find it difficult to obtain an actual 
copy of the policy,412 but they can also have trouble finding answers to 
specific questions they have.413  Some insurers have taken it upon 
themselves to provide consumers with important detailed information on 
their websites.414  However, the overall inability of insurers, insurance 
agents, and regulators to provide useful information to consumers leaves 
much to be desired.  This deficiency needs to be remedied before one can 
say that the belief that insurance contracts are adhesive is a complete myth. 
 
 402. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 403. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
 404. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
 405. See supra notes 324–27 and accompanying text. 
 406. See Fischer, supra note 84, at 1013–14 (“In some cases, the assumption is so strong 
as to allow for pro-insured rules of interpretation even though the portion of the insurance 
contract to be construed was drafted by the insured!”). 
 407. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 408. See supra notes 316–24 and accompanying text. 
 409. See supra notes 87–89, 320–23 and accompanying text. 
 410. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 411. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 412. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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D.  Deference to Legislatures 
While courts like to decide these types of questions on their own, the 
truth is that the government has probably already answered the self-defense 
question for them.  The government has a special interest in seeing that the 
insurance industry is run efficiently and provides adequate coverage to its 
customers.415  Consequently, state legislatures have taken it upon 
themselves to heavily regulate the industry and scrutinize all insurance 
policies that are sold to the public.416  In fact, insurance codes have been 
said to be so extensive that insurers are not freely contracting with the 
consumer.417  The contract is essentially what the government says it is.418 
Although this sentiment is not wholly accurate,419 state governments 
have shown that they will control insurance policies and the industry where 
they see fit.420  In light of this, the most logical approach to imposing terms 
in an insurance contract would be to leave this to the legislature.  This is 
especially true for acts of self-defense as they pertain to intentional injury 
exclusion clauses.  The self-defense issue has been arising in courts around 
the country since the 1970s.421  If state legislatures wanted to make insurers 
provide coverage for self-defense in personal liability policies, they have 
had plenty of time to make their intent clear.  If state governments have not 
acted, courts should approach the question from a purely textual 
perspective, not with public policy considerations in mind.422 
Nevertheless, there have been criticisms that the regulators have not been 
able to adequately perform their responsibilities.423  Even if this is the case, 
there is no reason to believe that judges are better positioned to be making 
these decisions.  When a court expands the scope of insurance coverage, the 
insurance company is often ill prepared to handle that extra risk.424  When 
premium payments were determined, this extra risk was not taken into 
account.425  A decision that is so critical to the entire industry is best left to 
the legislature.426  Judges are ill equipped to make a decision with such 
large ramifications based solely on the evidence of the two parties before 
the court.427 
 
 415. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 416. See supra notes 161–70 and accompanying text. 
 417. See Randall, supra note 87, at 126–35. 
 418. See id. 
 419. See supra Part III.C. 
 420. See supra notes 161–71 and accompanying text. 
 421. See, e.g., Mullen v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1977); Homes 
Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). 
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CONCLUSION 
The issue of whether self-defense falls within intentional injury exclusion 
clauses is not new, but it is important to both insurers and insureds.  Courts 
should decide that acts of self-defense are excluded from coverage in 
policies using the traditional exclusion clause.  Whether based on text 
alone, or also considering public policy, this standard is the most logical 
and the most beneficial to all parties and to society as a whole. 
 
